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PROTECTING PREACHERS FROM PREJUDICE: METHODS 
FOR IMPROVING ANALYSIS OF THE MINISTERIAL 
EXCEPTION TO TITLE VII 
ABSTRACT 
Since the early 1970s, an increasing number of courts have held that 
religious organizations have an absolute right to treat core employees, or 
“ministers,” however they please without fear of being held accountable by 
secular courts.  Though anti-discrimination legislation explicitly allows a 
religious institution to discriminate by hiring only ministers who practice the 
same religion as the hiring organization, such legislation prohibits both non-
religious and religious employers from engaging in racial discrimination, 
gender discrimination, or sexual harassment.  Federal circuit courts uniformly 
grant immunity to religious institutions from these neutral laws, basing their 
decisions on the First Amendment religion clauses, but the constitutional 
foundation for this immunity has been severely undermined by the Supreme 
Court. 
Instead of the current approach, which defers to religious organizations, 
this Comment argues that any right to church autonomy should be balanced 
against the government’s interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws.  The 
need for an appropriate balancing test is confirmed by recent lower court 
opinions that have struggled to justify a deferential approach in the face of 
employment decisions by religious institutions that violate federal law and lack 
any religious justification.  After arguing for a more sound constitutional 
approach, this Comment ultimately proposes an amendment to Title VII that 
would protect ministers from non-religious discrimination while shielding 
religious organizations from intrusion on religious expression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Father Justinian Rweyemamu, a black Catholic priest from 
Tanzania, sued his diocese and his superior, Bishop Michael Cote, alleging that 
he had been passed over for promotion and fired due to racial discrimination in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1  Despite his high approval 
ratings among church members, the promotion was given to a white male 
whom Rweyemamu alleged to be less qualified than him.2  The church 
countered that it had a right, grounded in the First Amendment, to be free from 
government intrusion into management of its internal affairs.3  The Second 
Circuit agreed and dismissed the case, without any further investigation of 
Rweyemamu’s claims, to avoid “plung[ing] the [court] into a maelstrom of 
Church policy, administration, and governance.”4 
By rejecting Rweyemamu’s claims without researching their validity or 
weighing the government’s interest in prohibiting racial discrimination, the 
Second Circuit joined the majority of circuit courts, deciding that federal 
employment legislation cannot be applied to religious organizations without 
violating the First Amendment, even in the face of blatant discrimination.5  
This judicially recognized constitutional limitation on federal employment law, 
termed the “ministerial exception,”6 is overly deferential to religious 
organizations, especially in light of Supreme Court opinions favoring the 
application of laws neutral toward religion, even when they may substantially 
burden the free exercise of religion.7 
 
 1 Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (“It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”). 
 2 See Rweyemamu v. Cote, No. 3:05CV00969, 2006 WL 306654, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2006), aff’d, 
520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (setting out the facts of the case more extensively). 
 3 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 201. 
 4 Id. at 209 (quoting Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
 5 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
ministers should only be allowed to proceed in claims against religious employers in situations where a church 
is “subject[ing] its clergy to corporal punishment or requir[ing] them to commit criminal acts”). 
 6 See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 206. 
 7 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (allowing application of 
neutral laws that meet particular criteria even if doing so substantially burdens the free exercise of religion), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (holding that 
application of neutral laws to intra-church disputes is constitutional even though it interferes with church 
autonomy). 
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This broad deference to religious organizations has been labeled by one 
journalist as the “most sweeping of [the] judicial protections” for religious 
employers against suits by employees.8  Indeed, Judge Posner, advocated for 
the ministerial exception as a constitutional limitation on Title VII, holding 
that religious employers should only be liable to ministers if their actions force 
ministers into criminal action or subject them to corporal punishment.9  While 
the First Amendment’s protection of religious organizations’ hiring and firing 
of ministers, who are considered core employees,10 based on genuine disputes 
over core doctrinal questions is undisputed,11 it is much less clear whether 
religious organizations should be absolutely immune from claims alleging 
sexual harassment,12 unfair wages,13 child labor,14 or discrimination15 when 
there is no religious justification.  Furthermore, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to look past pretextual religious justifications and hold 
organizations responsible for racial discrimination,16 even a religious 
organization’s right to fire a minister based on a limited religious justification, 
such as mediocre homilies,17 becomes unclear when there is overwhelming 
 
 8 Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at 
A1. 
 9 Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040–41. 
 10 See infra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
 11 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(discussing how precedent establishes that churches have freedom to decide matters of church governance, 
faith, and doctrine). 
 12 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding that the 
government’s interest in eliminating sexual harassment outweighed the church’s right to autonomy absent 
religious justification for the church’s actions). 
 13 See EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 716 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (applying the Equal 
Pay Act to a Christian school). 
 14 See Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1989) (balancing interests to 
decide that a church’s right to autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause did not outweigh the government’s 
interest in prohibiting child labor). 
 15 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (refusing to balance 
interests even when no religious justification was put forward for the discrimination because justifications 
were imaginable without the defendants having to put them forward). 
 16 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–05 (1983) (deciding that the IRS properly 
revoked Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status due to its prohibition of interracial relationships, which the 
university claimed was based on a biblical mandate, notwithstanding the university’s free exercise challenge); 
see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (stating that in 
the employment discrimination area, an agency does not violate the Constitution by seeking to determine 
whether a religious justification is actually pretext). 
 17 Some of the alleged reasons for firing Father Rweyemamu included “complaints regarding his 
homilies, complaints regarding his interaction with parish staff, . . . and the necessity of giving a unified and 
positive witness to the people of the parish.”  Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–06 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Prot. No. 20042458 (Sept. 6, 2005)). 
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evidence that the justification is mere pretext.18  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, churches should not be “free from all of the secular legal obligations 
that currently and routinely apply to them.”19 
Rweyemamu illustrates the major weakness in this majority approach to the 
ministerial exception: there is no clear constitutional foundation for it.20  After 
briefly mentioning the arguments over which procedural mechanism is 
appropriate for the exception,21 the Rweyemamu court recognized that the roots 
of the exception “remain[] a matter of some debate.”22  The court discussed, 
but never fully embraced, the three foundations commonly used to support the 
deferential approach: the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and 
an independent “right to choose ministers without government restriction,” or a 
right to organizational autonomy that implicates both clauses.23  The court 
cited cases showcasing the full spectrum of the debate over the ministerial 
exception.24  These cases include, on one end of the spectrum, decisions 
holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear even blatant claims of 
discrimination by ministers against their employers25 and, on the other end, 
decisions allowing ministers to proceed as long as their claims do “not infringe 
upon [an employer]’s freedom to select its ministers.”26  Then, by analogizing 
to other cases, the Rweyemamu court granted deference to the church without 
explicitly stating its justification.27 
 
 18 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222 (3d Cir. 2006), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/ 
051222p.pdf, vacated on grant of rehearing, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Employment discrimination 
unconnected to religious belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply the exercise 
of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitution protects.”). 
 19 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 20 See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 204–06 (discussing all the various approaches to the exception). 
 21 Id. at 206 n.4.  There are two distinct views on how the exception should operate procedurally.  See, 
e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing under Rule 12(b)(1) 
for lack of jurisdiction); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).  Some courts do not directly address the 
procedural mechanism but dismiss based on the constitutional question.  Gellington v. Christian Methodist 
Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding summary judgment for a church 
after deciding the religion clauses of the First Amendment “prohibit a church from being sued under Title VII 
by its clergy”). 
 22 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 205. 
 23 Id. at 204–06 (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167–
68 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (granting deference 
to a religious body before any religious justification for the discrimination was put forth). 
 26 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 310. 
 27 See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 209 (“We need not attempt to delineate the boundaries of the ministerial 
exception here, as we find that [the plaintiff]’s Title VII claim easily falls within them.”). 
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Without clarifying the foundation for the exception, the majority of circuit 
courts, like the Second Circuit in Rweyemamu, defer to religious organizations 
whenever a minister brings suit.28  Deference becomes especially troubling 
when certain unique or complex situations arise, such as when a church has 
possibly breached a minister’s employment contract29 or when a minister 
claims sexual harassment.30  An emerging minority of courts thus resort to 
balancing church and government interests when employees of religious 
organizations claim non-religious discrimination.31  For example, in Bollard v. 
California Province of the Society of Jesus, the Ninth Circuit chose to balance 
the interests of the parties to evaluate a minister’s claim of sexual harassment 
where the church could “not offer a religious justification for the harassment” 
and actually “condemn[ed the harassment] as inconsistent with [its] values and 
beliefs.”32 
This Comment argues that the emerging minority view is the correct 
constitutional approach because Supreme Court precedent has eroded all three 
foundations used to support the deferential approach.  First, Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith33 allows courts 
to apply neutral laws of generally applicability, such as Title VII,34 even when 
 
 28 See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) (using neither a Free Exercise nor an 
Establishment Clause test, yet vaguely basing dismissal on the First Amendment). 
 29 Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 208, 212 (N.J. 1992) (holding that two nuns bringing suit 
for breach of contract were not actually “ministers,” but leaving open the possibility that their suit could 
proceed even if they were ministers as long as the suit did not involve religious doctrine). 
 30 See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The 
Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harassment [the plaintiff] alleges; indeed, they condemn it 
as inconsistent with their values and beliefs.”). 
 31 See, e.g., id. (balancing competing interests to evaluate a minister’s sexual harassment claim against a 
religious employer). 
 32 Id. 
 33 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 34 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  Many commentators 
support the proposition that no matter what standard is used to define “neutral laws of generally applicability,” 
Title VII—with its religiously neutral goal of eliminating discrimination—likely satisfies this standard.  See, 
e.g., Jamie Darin Prenkert, Liberty, Diversity, Academic Freedom, and Survival: Preferential Hiring Among 
Religiously-Affiliated Institutions of Higher Education, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 46 (2004) (“Title VII, 
though not a criminal law like the one at issue in Smith, is almost certainly a neutral law of general 
applicability.” (citation omitted)).  As Professor Joanne Brant explains: 
While the identifying characteristics of a “neutral and generally applicable” law remain 
uncertain, federal anti-discrimination laws like Title VII are likely to qualify under any of the 
proposed standards. 
. . . . 
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the law substantially burdens free exercise of religion.35  Though nearly all of 
the circuit courts have distinguished Smith as addressing individual free 
exercise versus a church’s right to autonomy,36 the clear language of Smith 
suggests it may override the ministerial exception.  Second, the Court’s 
decision in Zelman v. Selman-Harris decided that if a law is neutral on its face 
and in its application, like Title VII, it does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.37  Third, a right-to-autonomy claim has been eroded by the Court’s 
most recent decision directly involving intra-church disputes, Jones v. Wolf, 
where it held that neutral principles of law could be applied to religious 
organizations despite infringing organizational autonomy.38 
To the extent a right to church autonomy survives these cases, this 
Comment argues that it certainly does not exist in the deferential form of the 
current ministerial exception.  This Comment contends that strict scrutiny 
review should be applied to church autonomy defenses and that courts should 
be allowed to consider evidence as to whether a proffered religious 
justification is merely pretext for discrimination.  Finally, this Comment 
proposes an amendment to Title VII that protects ministers whose suits can be 
determined using neutral principles of law and also accommodates the need to 
limit intrusion into church affairs.  Commentators have argued that a similar 
neutral-principles approach is needed but have failed to justify such an 
approach or demonstrate its feasibility.39 
 
 . . . [G]iven the independent purpose of the anti-discrimination laws and the exemptions 
provided to religious employers, it is difficult to imagine that those laws would not qualify as 
neutral laws of general application within the meaning of Smith. 
Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to 
Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 308–09 (1994). 
 35 See Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding that Smith overrides the 
ministerial exception). 
 36 Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 516 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[M]ost, if not all, . . . . courts have found that the ministerial exception survives Smith 
because the ministerial exception addresses the rights of the church while Smith addressed the rights of 
individuals.”). 
 37 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (upholding a law that is neutral on its face and in application); see also 
JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, 200–01 (2d ed. 2005) 
(describing the Zelman test as a two-pronged evaluation to see if a law is neutral both on its face and in 
application). 
 38 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (allowing court interference with church governance in a church property 
dispute “so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship 
or the tenets of faith”). 
 39 See Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of 
the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481 
(2001) (arguing for adjudication of ministers’ claims not implicating religious doctrine but grounding the 
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Part I of this Comment describes the birth of the ministerial exception and 
the right to autonomy.  Part II demonstrates that the deferential approach is not 
supported by the Supreme Court’s current approach to the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or a right to church autonomy.  Part III 
argues that, without further guidance from the Supreme Court, any existing 
First Amendment right to church autonomy should be weighed against the 
government’s compelling interest in applying neutral laws.  Finally, because of 
the current trend toward congressional standards of religious liberty, Part IV 
advocates an amendment to the current exceptions to Title VII to accommodate 
the interests of both ministers and religious organizations. 
I. THE MAJORITY DEFERENTIAL APPROACH TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The current majority approach to conflicts between application of neutral 
employment laws and a religious organization’s right to deal with its ministers 
as it wishes is to defer automatically to the organization’s employment 
decision and dismiss the minister’s suit.40  This approach is harsh in its 
application and inadequate to address situations where there is no genuine 
religious justification for the organization’s actions, such as when ministers 
claim sexual harassment.41  To understand how analysis of the ministerial 
exception can be improved, it is important to understand the flawed reasoning 
behind why such excessive deference is being granted.  This Part first explains 
the history and the contours of the majority deferential approach.  It then 
criticizes this approach for lacking precedential foundation and being unfairly 
harsh in its application. 
 
approach in Ninth Circuit case law struggling with sexual harassment cases rather than Supreme Court 
precedent, and failing to mention Jones v. Wolf or how this approach could be feasibly implemented); Shawna 
Meyer Eikenberry, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Access to Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 269 
(1998) (arguing a similar approach  but failing to link Jones v. Wolf to the intra-church dispute cases, address 
the possible applicability of strict scrutiny review, or recognize the need for a legislative solution); Lauren P. 
Heller, Modifying the Ministerial Exception: Providing Ministers with a Remedy for Employment 
Discrimination Under Title VII While Maintaining First Amendment Protections of Religious Freedom, 81 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2007) (arguing for a neutral-principles approach but hastily dismissing the Sherbert test; 
failing to address an independent right to autonomy and the implications of Jones v. Wolf; and never offering a 
legislative solution). 
 40 See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(siding with the majority of circuits in dismissing a minister’s case by deferring to the religious organization). 
 41 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving a claim of 
sexual harassment against a religious organization). 
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A. The History of a Peculiarly-Named Doctrine: The Ministerial Exception 
While a statutory exemption to Title VII allows religious organizations to 
make hiring decisions based upon religious denominational preferences,42 Title 
VII does not allow religious organizations “to make those same [hiring] 
decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.”43  The current approach 
to the ministers’ discrimination claims is not an extension of the statutory 
exemption, held constitutional in 1987,44 but a separate, judicially recognized 
constitutional limitation to federal employment law.45  Religious organizations 
may raise a defense to ministers’ non-religious discrimination claims by 
invoking a constitutional right to make employment decisions regarding 
ministers without any interference from secular courts.46  Under this 
exemption, even claims against religious employers for sexual harassment47 or 
failure to meet obligations under an employment contract,48 infringe those 
employers’ right to church autonomy. 
Since the early 1970s, an increasing number of circuit courts have 
recognized this constitutional right, naming it the “ministerial exception” to 
Title VII.49  According to judges on the Ninth Circuit, this name causes 
confusion because it “is not really an ‘exception’ at all; rather, it is a limitation 
on Title VII imposed by the Constitution.”50  The phrase further causes 
confusion because it applies to positions that are not typically seen as 
ministerial, such as a kitchen manager at a Jewish nursing home,51 a church 
 
 42 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting from denial of petition for panel rehearing en banc) (noting that the statutory exemption protects, for 
example, a Catholic church from a discrimination suit brought by a Presbyterian applying to be a priest). 
 43 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 44 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (holding Title VII’s exemption of religious organizations from religious discrimination 
suits to be constitutional). 
 45 Elvig, 397 F.3d at 800 (denoting the differences between the statutory exemption and the constitutional 
limitation). 
 46 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Federal courts are secular 
agencies [and] therefore do not exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of religious organizations.”). 
 47 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving a sexual 
harassment claim against a religious organization). 
 48 See Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 208 (N.J. 1992) (addressing ministerial exception 
concerns when two nuns sued for violations of their employment contracts). 
 49 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (recognizing the ministerial exception 
for the first time while addressing a sex discrimination claim by a minister). 
 50 Elvig, 397 F.3d at 800 (describing the background of the confusion surrounding the ministerial 
exception). 
 51 See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying 
the ministerial exception to the kosher supervisor of the kitchen in a Jewish nursing home). 
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organist,52 a church press secretary,53 and an executive at a religious college.54  
The exception also applies beyond Title VII due to its constitutional 
grounding.55  It applies in cases where employees of religious organizations 
bring age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA),56 disability discrimination claims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),57 and unfair wage claims under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA).58 
Most circuit courts take an approach, first articulated by the Fifth Circuit in 
McClure v. Salvation Army,59 that defers to the religious organization—
without regard to the government’s interest in prohibiting discrimination—due 
to the inherently spiritual nature of the appointment of clergy.60  The McClure 
court’s reasoning, repeated verbatim by many of the circuits adopting the 
exception,61 describes “the relationship between an organized church and its 
ministers” as its “lifeblood.”62  Since ministers are the “chief instrument by 
which the church seeks to fulfill its purposes,” all aspects of ministerial 
employment are within the “religious mission of [a] church.”63  Accordingly, 
this “lifeblood” justification holds that “because ministerial employment is 
inextricably tied to the organization’s functions as a religious entity, judicial 
review of ministerial employment decisions is tantamount to the review of 
 
 52 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the 
ministerial exception to an organist/music director). 
 53 See Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the 
ministerial exception to a press secretary). 
 54 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the ministerial exception to 
an administrator at a Christian university). 
 55 See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing application of the ministerial 
exception beyond Title VII). 
 56 See id. (applying the ministerial exception to a claim under the ADEA). 
 57 See Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese, 233 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“[J]ust as 
there is a ministerial exception to Title VII, there must also be a ministerial exception to ADA claims.”). 
 58 See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying the ministerial 
exception to a claim under the FLSA). 
59 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 60 See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (using 
McClure as support for the idea that “[p]ersonnel decisions by church-affiliated institutions affecting clergy 
are per se religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts”). 
 61 See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting the McClure reasoning and dismissing the case without balancing the 
government’s interest). 
 62 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d at 558. 
 63 Id. at 559. 
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religious belief and practice, and consequently violates the religious 
organization’s free exercise rights.”64 
By relying on McClure, courts dismiss suits by ministers fired under 
suspicious circumstances without ever addressing the merits of the ministers’ 
claims.65  Even after acknowledging that sex discrimination had occurred 
against a minister who was fired after experiencing pregnancy complications, 
the Fifth Circuit still dismissed the suit based on McClure.66  The Seventh 
Circuit has held that, once a court has determined that an employee is a 
minister, it should dismiss the minister’s suit against the religious organization 
even if no justification is offered for the discrimination, and the merits of the 
discrimination claim could be decided without violating the First 
Amendment.67  The Fourth Circuit has agreed, finding that “the church need  
not . . . proffer any religious justification for its decision, for the Free Exercise 
Clause ‘protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.’”68 
The precedent relied on by these courts is a series of Supreme Court 
decisions regarding intra-church disputes,69 especially language in Kedroff v. 
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America that 
churches have a right “to decide for themselves, free from state interference, 
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”70   
Implicating a principle of separation of church and state,71 this right is often 
called a “right to church autonomy” in religious organization governance.72  
 
 64 Heller, supra note 39, at 671. 
 65 See Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a music director’s claim under 
the ADA that she was abruptly fired after suffering a number of disabilities); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 883 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (dismissing a claim by a 
teacher in a religious school who alleged she was fired after being diagnosed with narcolepsy and trying to 
return to work). 
 66 See Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 344 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (concluding that illegal sex discrimination did in fact occur against a minister after she experienced 
post-partum depression, but relying on McClure to dismiss the suit). 
 67 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006); Alicea-Hernandez v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2003) (deciding that a federal court could hear 
discrimination claims were it not for the employee’s position as a minister). 
 68 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 69 See Combs, 173 F.3d at 346–47 (citing McClure and listing the Supreme Court cases McClure relied 
on). 
 70 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 71 See WITTE, supra note 37, at 160 (discussing how a principle of separation of church and state was 
implicated by the intra-church property cases). 
 72 Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor 
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1388–89 (1981). 
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Modern courts, following McClure, often do not specify whether this right is 
derived from the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or some 
combination of the two.73  Often courts, including the Rweyemamu court, 
mention one or both of the religion clauses when using this right to autonomy 
to dismiss a minister’s claim.74  While the Supreme Court has never clearly 
enunciated the details of this right,75 the doctrine has been recognized in a 
series of intra-church disputes starting in 1871 with Watson v. Jones.76  In 
Watson v. Jones and similar subsequent cases, the Court deferred to the highest 
governing body of the church when faced with choosing a side in a dispute 
between religious factions arguing over the true leader of the church or matters 
of church doctrine.77  As held in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, “civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest 
judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of 
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”78 
B. Deficiencies in the Deferential Approach 
Though relied on as the primary support for the deferential approach, 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with intra-church disputes never dealt with a 
conflict between neutral, generally applicable government regulations, like 
Title VII, and religious organizations.79  In the intra-church dispute cases, the 
 
 73 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing both religion clauses and 
dismissing the claim using reasoning similar to McClure). 
 74 Id. (“We need not attempt to delineate the boundaries of the ministerial exception here, as we find that 
Father Justinian’s Title VII claim easily falls within them.”). 
 75 See Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 
1773, 1774–75 (“[T]he Court has never directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when 
government interferes with religious-group affairs.”); Laycock, supra note 72, at 1395 (“The doctrinal details 
of this right to autonomy are in flux and not entirely clear.”). 
 76 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 77 See id. at 734 (deferring to the governing church body in a dispute between two factions over church 
property); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 441 (1969) (involving a dispute over church property after two local churches seceded from the larger 
church body); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119–20 
(1952) (deciding that a state legislature cannot transfer control of property from the Russian to American 
Orthodox Church); Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976) 
(dismissing the case of a minister who was defrocked following a dispute over control of an orthodox church). 
 78 Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can., 426 U.S. at 713. 
 79 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We acknowledge that Kedroff 
and the other Supreme Court cases that we and other courts have cited in support of the ministerial exception 
did not involve neutral statutes of general application.”); see also Underkuffler, supra note 75, at 1774–75 
(“[T]he Court has never directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when government interferes 
with religious-group affairs.”). 
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interests colliding were those of two competing religious factions.80  In those 
cases, it was clear that the Court should not favor one religious doctrine or 
practice over another.81  Yet when the issue is whether a neutral law conflicts 
with a right to free exercise of religion, there are judicial tests—such as the 
strict scrutiny test addressed in Part II—that the Court can use to determine 
whether the law at issue infringes religious liberty.82  Lower courts adopting 
the deferential approach err by failing to base their deference on the Supreme 
Court precedent most analogous to the situation where neutral federal 
employment law conflicts with religious liberty. 
Along with lacking precedential support, the deferential approach is also 
unfairly harsh in its application when a religious organization puts forward no 
genuine religious justification for its actions.83  When faced with a situation 
where a minister claimed sexual harassment against her religious employer, the 
Ninth Circuit engaged in the emerging minority approach of balancing the 
church’s interest in autonomy with the government’s interest in enforcing its 
laws.84  After balancing those interests, the court allowed the minister to 
proceed in her claim, since the church had no religious justification for the 
harassment.85  In a second case invoking the decision, the judges argued that a 
right to church autonomy could not be absolute86 and that “[a] church is 
required to comply with Title VII when a minister is sexually harassed by 
another minister employed by the church, just as a church is required to 
comply with state tort laws when a parishioner is sexually abused by a minister 
employed by the church.”87  The court further suggested that churches should 
not be free from minimum wage laws or child labor laws.88  If a court granted 
 
 80 See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 698 (dismissing a case brought by a bishop who claimed that under 
church doctrine he was the true bishop of a certain diocese and thus had control of the diocese’s assets despite 
the contrary claims of the higher church governing body). 
 81 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government 
may not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”). 
 82 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny review). 
 83 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (resorting to a 
balancing of interests rather than conceding the harsh results of deference). 
 84 See id. (deciding that the government’s interest in eliminating sexual harassment outweighs a right to 
church autonomy). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 790–95 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (W. Fletcher, J., 
concurring in the order denying petition for panel rehearing en banc). 
 87 Id. at 795. 
 88 Id. at 792 (“The First Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from all statutes that regulate 
employment.”).  “For example, the First Amendment does not exempt religious institutions from laws that 
regulate the minimum wage or the use of child labor, even though both involve employment relationships.”  
Id. (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)). 
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deference to a religious organization in this type of case, the result would be 
exceedingly harsh. 
Along with being overly harsh, absolute deference is a dangerous 
misunderstanding of the right to church autonomy, which, according to 
scholars, “is not absolute.”89  As Kedroff states, the First Amendment grants 
religious organizations “[f]reedom to select . . . clergy” only “where no 
improper methods of choice are proven.”90  The Supreme Court reinforced the 
non-absolute nature of this right in the context of enforcing Title VII against a 
religious institution, stating that such institutions “cannot claim to be wholly 
free from some state regulation.”91  Echoing the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Smith, it contradicts “both constitutional tradition and common sense” 
to allow religious organizations to become a law unto themselves, only obliged 
to obey laws that agree with their religious beliefs.92  If a church’s actions 
towards its ministers are untouchable by secular courts due to the inherently 
religious nature of the ministerial position, then a church would be allowed to 
engage in all manners of inhumane or abusive conduct against its ministers 
without being held accountable in a court of law.  Absolute deference to 
religious organizations, without any balancing of the most basic and 
fundamental governmental interests, should not be acceptable in our society. 
II. LACK OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFERENTIAL 
APPROACH 
Along with the infirmities of the deferential approach mentioned in Part I, 
the approach is also undermined by important Supreme Court precedent on 
every constitutional foundation on which it attempts to stand.  Three primary 
constitutional foundations are used by courts to justify the ministerial 
exception: the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and a right to 
autonomy based generally in the First Amendment.93  This Part first argues that 
 
 89 Laycock, supra note 72, at 1394. 
 90 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
 91 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986). 
 92 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (“To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon 
the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs . . . —permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law 
unto himself,’—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.” (citation omitted)). 
 93 See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the wide diversity of 
different foundational justifications for the ministerial exception).  Caroline Corbin has argued that the 
exception survives based on the First Amendment right of expressive association based on Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), but acknowledges that this approach still allows ministers’ suits if the 
discrimination is not justified by religious doctrine.  Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The 
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free exercise jurisprudence has been reduced to a neutrality test that invalidates 
the deferential approach.  Next, it demonstrates why the Establishment Clause 
fails to support the deferential approach, since it also requires only that laws 
pass a test of neutrality.  Finally, this Part contends that the Supreme Court has 
concluded that the right to church autonomy is not absolute and can be 
intruded upon by neutral principles of law.94 
A. The Deferential Approach Is Invalidated by Modern Free Exercise 
Jurisprudence 
Many courts ground the protection of religious organizations in an 
organization’s right under the Free Exercise Clause to express its religious 
beliefs through its choice of ministers.95  This section first examines the history 
of free exercise jurisprudence leading up to Employment Division v. Smith, the 
decision enumerating the Supreme Court’s current approach to the Free 
Exercise Clause.  If Smith applies to ministerial exception cases, as only a few 
commentators have argued,96 then the deferential approach is rejected, and 
Title VII, as a generally applicable neutral law,97 will always be applied to 
religious organizations.  Yet most courts have used convoluted reasoning to 
distinguish Smith from the ministerial exception cases.98  After examining the 
history of the Free Exercise Clause, this Part argues that the two primary 
methods courts use to distinguish Smith are flawed.  The most widely used of 
these arguments is that Smith applies to individuals and not to organizations.  
A few courts have advanced a secondary, and arguably weaker, argument that 
 
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1972 
(2007). 
 94 Scholars also debate whether the Founders ever intended a right to church autonomy; this debate 
evidences a lack of clear original intent.  Compare Joshua D. Dunlap, When Big Brother Plays God: The 
Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2021–23 (2007) 
(supporting the ministerial exception using Madison’s writings), with Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption 
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391, 418–20 (1987) 
(acknowledging Madison’s writing but contrasting it with Jefferson’s and arguing that there was no original 
intent for a right to church autonomy). 
 95 See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McClure and deciding, without 
performing traditional Free Exercise Clause analysis, that any encroachment into the relationship between 
minister and religious employer violates the Free Exercise Clause). 
 96 Brant, supra note 34, at 320 (“After Smith, it appears religious employers will be unable to obtain 
constitutional exemptions from employment discrimination laws.”). 
 97 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 98 See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 
2000) (joining the D.C. and Fifth Circuits in holding that the ministerial exception survived Smith).  But see 
Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding that a religious organization could not 
assert the free exercise ministerial exception rights that it could have asserted before the Smith case). 
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Smith does not apply to cases where elements of both religion clauses are 
violated. 
1. The Traditional Approaches to the Free Exercise Clause 
In most of the early free exercise cases, the Supreme Court applied a low 
level of scrutiny to laws burdening religious freedom and usually found for the 
government.99  Starting in 1940, the Court began applying a heightened 
standard of review when analyzing cases involving the Free Exercise 
Clause.100  In 1963, the Court further heightened this analysis, applying a 
“strict scrutiny” approach in Sherbert v. Verner.101  This approach, as affirmed 
in subsequent cases,102 “asks whether government has placed a substantial 
burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, 
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.”103  Sherbert 
provides an example of the application of the strict scrutiny balancing test that 
could be applied to religious group autonomy cases.104 
Ms. Sherbert, the plaintiff, was fired because she would not work on 
Saturdays due to her faith as a Seventh-day Adventist; she then applied for 
unemployment benefits.105  Based on a law that denied benefits to anyone who 
failed to accept suitable work when offered, the South Carolina Employment 
Security Commission denied Ms. Sherbert’s claim for unemployment 
benefits.106  Ms. Sherbert appealed, claiming that the statute abridged her right 
to the free exercise of her religion under the Free Exercise Clause.107  The 
Supreme Court held that this denial of benefits did constitute a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of Ms. Sherbert’s faith.108  The Court then 
examined the state’s interest in enforcing the provision against Ms. Sherbert.109  
 
 99 WITTE, supra note 37, at 149 (“In [its first free exercise case], the Court applied a very low level of 
scrutiny. . . .  Every early religious liberty case that applied this standard of review found for the government.” 
(citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879))). 
 100 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (holding that regulation of free exercise is legal 
only if it is non-discriminatory and not unduly burdensome to the free exercise of religion). 
 101 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
 102 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–21 (1972) (affirming and further articulating the 
Sherbert approach). 
 103 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220–21) (utilizing 
the balancing test articulated in Sherbert). 
 104 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402. 
 105 Id. at 399. 
 106 Id. at 400–01. 
 107 Id. at 401. 
 108 Id. at 404. 
 109 Id. at 406. 
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The state argued that it had to enforce the statute to avoid being inundated with 
false claims.110  The Court did not view this as compelling, especially due to 
the availability of regulatory schemes that could achieve the government’s 
purpose without infringing free exercise rights.111  The Court thus found the 
state’s law unconstitutional as applied.112 
The strict scrutiny balancing test employed by the Sherbert Court was used 
as the prevailing test for analyzing claims involving violations of the Free 
Exercise Clause until 1990.113  The Supreme Court used this test ten times, 
finding for the religious claimant six times and the government four times.114  
Aside from these cases, during this period the Court also addressed a religious 
employer’s First Amendment objection to application of Title VII and 
reasoned that an agency “violates no constitutional rights by merely 
investigating the circumstances of [the] discharge [of an employee of a 
religious institution] . . . if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-
based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.”115 
In 1990, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Smith, formally 
rejecting the Sherbert strict scrutiny test for analyzing religiously neutral 
laws.116  In Smith, a state agency fired two members of the Native American 
Church for use of peyote, an illegal controlled substance that members used in 
religious ceremonies.117  The members were denied unemployment benefits 
and appealed on the ground that the peyote prohibition violated their free 
exercise rights.118  The Supreme Court decided that individuals should be 
forced to abide by any “valid and neutral law of general applicability,” even if 
it conflicts with or burdens their religious beliefs, as long as there is a rational 
basis for the law.119 
 
 110 Id. at 407. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 401, 410. 
 113 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894–95 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (discussing how the case would affect the strict scrutiny test). 
 114 WITTE, supra note 37, at 149. 
 115 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986). 
 116 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85. 
 117 Id. at 874. 
 118 Id. at 874–76. 
 119 Id. at 879. 
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The decision in Smith was met with criticism from both outside and inside 
the Supreme Court.120  Justice O’Conner and the dissenting Justices felt that 
the majority’s rejection of strict scrutiny was a misinterpretation of free 
exercise case law.121  These Justices continued to call for the Smith decision to 
be overturned in favor of the Sherbert approach.122  Outside the Court, some 
critics claimed that Smith obliterated protection for religious liberty under the 
Free Exercise Clause,123 while others tried to mitigate the damages by 
restricting Smith to its facts.124  Though courts have tried, Smith is difficult to 
confine to its facts because the opinion states that the First Amendment is not 
“offended” if “prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is . . . merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision”125 
and that “the government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions 
of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public 
policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a 
religious objector’s spiritual development.’”126 
Congress responded in 1993 by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA).127  The Act sought to reinstate the Sherbert test by requiring strict 
scrutiny analysis when a party claimed free exercise had been substantially 
burdened.128  The Supreme Court struck the Act down as an unconstitutional 
overreaching by Congress as applied to states but allowed it to stand when 
applied to federal action.129  The Court has applied RFRA to federal statutes,130 
 
 120 See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1992) (“Members of the media, academics, members of Congress, 
and religious interest groups greeted the [Smith] decision with condemnation and despair.”). 
 121 Smith, 494 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963)). 
 122 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 547 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 578 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 123 See John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and the Demise of the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 116, 121 (1997) (discussing how Smith limited religious liberty 
protection); Leslie L. Dollen, Casenote, The Free Exercise Clause Redefined: The Eradication of Religious 
Liberties in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 143, 
144 (1991) (arguing Smith “drastically limited” religious liberties). 
 124 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006) (limiting the reach of Smith 
by using it only as support for the proposition that religious organizations are not allowed to force criminal 
activity upon their ministers). 
 125 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 126 Id. at 885 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 127 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 (recognizing that Congress enacted RFRA “in direct response” to Smith). 
 128 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(b) (2006) (reinstating the Sherbert strict scrutiny test). 
 129 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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but the statute is arguably inapplicable in many circumstances, including all 
suits to which the government is not a party, which would include cases such 
as Rweyemamu.131 
Smith also held that if a law is not neutral, it will be allowed to stand only if 
it passes the Sherbert strict scrutiny analysis.132  The Court subsequently 
affirmed this approach in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,133 a 
case addressing a state law that prohibited animal sacrifices in a manner that 
primarily affected one particular religious sect.134  The Court decided that since 
this law applied solely to a particular religious group, the law was not 
neutral.135  It then applied strict scrutiny and decided that the government 
interests in maintaining public health and preventing animal cruelty were not 
compelling enough to justify substantially burdening this particular religious 
group, especially in light of regulatory options that were less restrictive than a 
complete animal sacrifice ban.136 
2. Smith Likely Applies to Organizations and Impedes Arguments for 
Deference 
When presented with the question, most courts have decided that Smith 
does not undermine the ministerial exception, reasoning that Smith applies only 
to the rights of individuals, while the ministerial exception applies to the rights 
of the religious organization.137  These courts argue that Smith only applies to 
the free exercise rights of an individual to carry out religious activity and not to 
religious organizations’ rights to manage ministers without government 
oversight.138 
 
 130 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432 (2006) (deciding 
that the government could not enforce the Controlled Substance Act against a religious group using a 
controlled substance because the government failed to show a compelling interest in regulating sacramental 
use of the substance). 
 131 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (“RFRA is applicable 
only to suits to which the government is a party.”). 
 132 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
 133 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993). 
 134 Id. at 526. 
 135 Id. at 535. 
 136 Id. at 539. 
 137 Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 516 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[M]ost, if not all . . . courts have found that the ministerial exception survives Smith 
because the ministerial exception addresses the rights of the church while Smith addressed the rights of 
individuals.”). 
 138 Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348–49 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (agreeing with the D.C. Circuit Court that Smith is inapplicable to questions of church autonomy). 
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Proponents of this distinction point to two aspects of the language in 
Smith.139  First, when discussing its holding, the Court consistently refers to the 
rights held by individuals.140  Second, the Smith Court exempts from its 
holding situations where the government is asked to lend “its power to one or 
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”141  
Proponents argue that this language preserves an absolute right to church 
autonomy without any interference from neutral laws.142  Courts championing 
the deferential approach point out that Smith cites cases involving intra-church 
disputes—the precedential foundation of the right to church autonomy—as 
support for this exemption.143 
Although they serve as the basis for exempting organizations from Smith, 
none of the Supreme Court cases dealing with intra-church disputes address 
whether a neutral, generally applicable law should apply to a religious 
organization.144  The Smith majority and subsequent courts primarily cite three 
Supreme Court cases as examples of “controversies over religious authority” 
where the Smith holding would not apply.145  Each of these cases involved a 
dispute over church control after a split, but none of them involved religiously 
neutral laws.146  Only one of the cases, Kedroff, actually involved a challenge 
 
 139 See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1782 (2008) (arguing that Smith was only concerned with individuals and was not 
intended to undermine the right to church autonomy). 
 140 The Court states that “we have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”  Employment 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (emphasis added).  Later, the Court 
comments that making “an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence 
with his religious beliefs . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense,” id. at 885 (emphasis 
added), and that it is not “possible to limit the impact of respondents’ proposal by requiring a ‘compelling state 
interest’ only when the conduct prohibited is ‘central’ to the individual’s religion.”  Id. at 886. (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 141 Id. at 877. 
 142 See Note, supra note 139, at 1782 (arguing that the language in Smith preserves the ministerial 
exception as a protection of the autonomy of religious organizations). 
 143 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
 144 See id. at 463 (“We acknowledge that Kedroff and the other Supreme Court cases that we and other 
courts have cited in support of the ministerial exception did not involve neutral statutes of general 
application.”). 
 145 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
 146 See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 441 (1969) (involving a dispute over church property after two local churches seceded from the 
larger church body); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119–120 (holding that a state legislature cannot transfer control of 
property from the Russian to American Orthodox Church); see also Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & 
Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 697–98 (1976) (dismissing the case of a minister who was defrocked 
following a dispute over church control). 
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to a statute, but the statute explicitly attempted to remove control of church 
property from a hierarchical religious body and thus was neither neutral nor 
generally applicable.147  The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged this discrepancy 
between the precedent cited by Smith and ministerial exception cases but says 
it simply “cannot believe” that the Supreme Court would get rid of the 
protection of religious liberty recognized by the ministerial exception.148  
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s surprise at the apparent scope of the Smith decision, 
the astonishment of a circuit court is inadequate to overturn the clear language 
of a Supreme Court majority.149  These courts also ignore that Smith relied on 
precedent that allowed neutral government action—compelling or not—to 
substantially burden an organization’s free exercise of its religious beliefs.150 
In addition to pointing out the lack of precedent, opponents of exempting 
the ministerial exception from Smith argue that it is a better policy to apply the 
Free Exercise Clause equally to churches and to individuals.151  For example if 
different standards were applied to churches and individuals, churches might 
be allowed to give peyote to members in a religious ceremony, but individuals 
would be outlawed from ingesting it.152  Clearly, Smith at least makes the 
ministerial exception’s survival more difficult, especially the Court’s refusal to 
weigh the government’s interest.153  The entire doctrine, in many circuits, now 
rests on the unique, but unclear, judicial treatment of church autonomy.154  The 
Supreme Court may eventually acknowledge that Smith overrides the 
ministerial exception, but until it explicitly does so, circuit courts are likely to 
continue using the distinction between individuals and organizations to keep 
the ministerial exception alive. 
 
 147 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 97. 
 148 See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 463 (acknowledging that the church dispute cases did not 
involve neutral laws, yet stating, “we cannot believe that the Supreme Court in Smith intended to qualify this 
century-old affirmation of a church’s sovereignty over its own affairs”). 
 149 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“[P]recedent of this Court must be followed by the 
lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”). 
 150 Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (noting that in Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988), the Court had allowed the government to pave a road through a Native American sacred site that was 
used for “religious purposes,” despite its substantial burden on the tribes). 
 151 See, e.g., Underkuffler, supra note 75, at 1787 (“[T]here is no convincing basis for distinguishing 
individual religious exemptions, struck down in Smith, from aggressive forms of religious-group autonomy.”). 
 152 Corbin, supra note 93, at 1989. 
 153 See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 462–63 (attempting to distinguish Smith). 
 154 See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 
348–49 (5th Cir. 1999) (relying solely on the precedential history of special treatment of intra-church disputes 
to sustain the ministerial exception post-Smith). 
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3. Smith’s “Hybrid-Rights” Language Is Dicta and Unworkable 
Because of the weakness of the individual-versus-organization distinction, 
some courts try to exempt ministerial exception cases from Smith’s holding by 
using Smith’s exemption for “hybrid situations.”155  This distinction is even 
weaker than the individual-versus-organization distinction but warrants 
discussion because lower courts have advanced it to justify the survival of the 
deferential approach. 
In dicta, the Smith majority mentioned that if a claim “involve[d] not the 
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press,” 
then courts could use the First Amendment to bar application of a neutral 
law.156  Such claims were termed “hybrid situation[s].”157  In trying to 
distinguish Smith, the D.C. Circuit, in EEOC v. Catholic University of 
America, posited that ministerial exception cases are hybrid situations.158  
According to the D.C. Circuit, the question of whether neutral laws can be 
applied to religious organizations invokes Free Exercise Clause concerns, and 
the question of whether courts can be entangled in deciding religious disputes 
invokes Establishment Clause concerns.159  After distinguishing Smith, the 
court used the deferential approach to dismiss the minister’s suit.160 
Even assuming that ministers’ claims are hybrid situations—a debatable 
proposition161 —both scholars and courts have animadverted on the propriety 
of ever using the hybrid situation theory, with many ultimately rejecting it as 
 
 155 See, e.g., Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467 (“[T]his case presents the kind of ‘hybrid situation’ 
referred to in Smith that permits us to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause even if our earlier conclusion 
that the ministerial exception survived Smith should prove mistaken.”).  The Smith court explicitly held that 
the Smith facts did not present a “hybrid situation,” and thus the decision did not address those situations 
where the claim implicated two different rights.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 156 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 157 Id. at 882. 
 158 See Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467 (deciding that ministerial exception cases are hybrid 
situations); see also Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 
694, 706 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (describing a church employee’s sexual harassment claim as a “hybrid situation” but 
denying church autonomy defenses because the plaintiffs were “secular, lay employees who performed non-
religious, administrative tasks for a religious institution”). 
 159 Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467 (arguing that ministerial exception cases involve both 
establishment and free exercise concerns). 
 160 Id. (using hybrid situations to distinguish the case and then granting deference). 
 161 See Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational Freedoms of 
Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 209 (2005) (arguing that ministerial exception cases may not 
be hybrid situations because they do not involve two distinct fundamental rights). 
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either dicta or an unworkable legal standard.162  Since the Smith court gave no 
further instruction on how hybrid situations affect free exercise claims, some 
courts have decided it is illogical to vary standards of religious liberty based on 
whether additional constitutional provisions are implicated.163  Other courts 
say that an independently viable claim is required, essentially rendering the 
free exercise claim superfluous.164  A third group of courts have attempted to 
fabricate a middle standard by requiring that the free exercise claim have a 
“colorable” companion claim.165  The widespread confusion over the theory 
and the theory’s inability to garner majority support in subsequent Supreme 
Court free exercise cases166 has led many circuit courts to reject the hybrid 
situation theory outright as unworkable dicta.167 
B. Mistaken Reliance on the Establishment Clause 
A number of courts base the ministerial exception on the ground that 
picking a side in a dispute centered on religion would violate the Establishment 
Clause by excessively entangling the court in religious matters.168  Some 
 
 162 See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3rd Cir. 2008) (“Until the Supreme Court 
provides direction, we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.”); Ryan M. Akers, Begging the High Court 
for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004) 
(describing the confusion caused by the theory); Note, supra note 139, at 1781 n.38 (recognizing that the 
theory “is almost universally despised”). 
 163 E.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th 
Cir. 1993). 
 164 Combs, 540 F.3d at 245–46 (“This stringent approach requiring an independently valid companion 
claim has received criticism, most notably that such a requirement would make the free exercise claim 
superfluous.”); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]f a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from 
a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then there would have been 
no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at 
all.”). 
 165 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2004) (criticizing the many courts 
that have used an independently viable approach and articulating a colorable claim approach). 
 166 See Combs, 540 F.3d at 246–47 (“Since Smith, a majority of the Court has not confirmed the viability 
of the hybrid-rights theory.”).  Specifically, the Third Circuit notes Justice Souter’s concurrence in Hialeah, 
which “criticized the hybrid-rights theory,” and the majority opinion in Boerne which seemed to gloss over a 
hybrid situation issue.  Id. at 246 n.23. 
 167 See id. at 246–47 (finding the language to be unworkable dicta in agreement with Sixth and Second 
circuit decisions). 
 168 Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]aking sides in a religious dispute would 
lead an Article III court into excessive entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause.”) (citing Tomic 
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Gellington v. Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (basing the exception on the 
Establishment Clause along with the Free Exercise Clause); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian 
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commentators suggest analyzing these cases under both Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause doctrines,169 but in the wake of Smith, others have 
reasoned that the Establishment Clause may be the only remaining religion 
clause on which the ministerial exception can be grounded.170  Indeed, in 
dismissing Rweyemamu’s discrimination claim, the Second Circuit reasoned 
that it was better to dismiss the case than entangle the court in deciding 
religious matters.171  The court reasoned that this approach is fair since courts 
would still be able to decide secular cases like fraudulent employment 
practices.172 
The idea of excessive entanglement derives from the dominant test used to 
analyze Establishment Clause claims, which was first articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.173  This test consists of three prongs: 
“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”174  Most circuit courts focus on the third prong—excessive 
government entanglement—when using the Establishment Clause to support 
the ministerial exception.175  In explaining its focus on entanglement, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that “Title VII has an obvious secular legislative purpose,  
and . . . its principal effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.  The only 
open question is whether applying Title VII in the circumstances of this case 
would foster an impermissible government entanglement with religion.”176  
 
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (dismissing the case primarily based on the Establishment Clause 
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), but also based on the Free Exercise Clause). 
 169 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (analyzing whether deciding 
the case would result in “entanglement” and also using a right to church autonomy); William P. Marshall & 
Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 
293, 295 (1986) (recognizing that “[t]he [F]ree [E]xercise [C]lause traditionally has been the constitutional 
provision under which alleged government infringement upon religious liberty has been examined,” but 
arguing that these claims should also involve an Establishment Clause analysis). 
 170 Note, Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 116 (2003).  
But see Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1718 (2004) (arguing that grounding the 
ministerial exception completely in the Establishment Clause is “counterintuitive”). 
 171 Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208–09. 
 172 Id. 
 173 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (addressing 
whether the Establishment Clause supports the ministerial exception). 
 176 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Some courts assume that a government entity’s investigation into church 
employment would create excessive entanglement with church management.177 
Yet even though some courts have classified almost any intrusion into 
church affairs as excessive entanglement,178 in 1997, the Supreme Court in 
Agostini v. Felton noted that “[i]nteraction between church and state is 
inevitable.”179  The Court decided that entanglement that has “the effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion” is excessive entanglement.180  Title VII 
neither advances nor inhibits religion of its own accord because courts are only 
forced to interact with a church’s ability to freely make hiring decisions when 
claimants use the courts to enforce Title VII. 
It is the Free Exercise Clause, instead of the Establishment Clause, that has 
historically been used to decide whether a court can enforce a particular law 
that restricts a religious organization’s autonomy.181  While intervention by the 
judiciary may incidentally have the appearance of endorsing or disapproving of 
a religion, the entanglement concerns in ministerial exception cases primarily 
affect a religious organization’s free exercise rights by restricting the way it 
exercises its spiritual functions; hence these questions should be analyzed 
under the Free Exercise Clause.182  Similarly, religious liberty scholar Douglas 
Laycock argues that because “entanglement” is a phenomenon that occurs 
under both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analysis, commentators 
have been misled into thinking government intrusion into church autonomy is 
an establishment concern when it is really a free exercise question.183 
 
 177 See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(deciding that “[i]nvestigation by a government entity into a church’s employment of its clergy would almost 
always entail excessive government entanglement into the internal management of the church” in violation of 
the Establishment Clause); see also EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir.1996) (“An 
excessive entanglement may occur where there is a sufficiently intrusive investigation by a government entity 
into a church’s employment of its clergy.”). 
 178 See Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304. 
 179 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997). 
 180 Id. 
 181 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) 
(“Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said 
to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.”); 
see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (using the Free Exercise 
Clause to analyze a case concerning the defrocking of a minister after a dispute over church control). 
 182 See Heller, supra note 39, at 689 (arguing that ministerial exception cases should be analyzed under 
the Free Exercise Clause despite incidental endorsement concerns). 
 183 Laycock, supra note 72, at 1394 (arguing that church autonomy should be analyzed under the Free 
Exercise rather than the Establishment Clause). 
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In 2002, the Supreme Court further refined its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and dealt a final blow to use of the Establishment Clause as the 
justification for the ministerial exception in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.184  In 
Zelman, the Court synchronized its Establishment Clause jurisprudence with 
its Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in Smith by reducing Establishment 
Clause analysis to a neutrality inquiry.185  As distilled by scholars, Zelman’s 
two-part test simply asks whether a law is (1) neutral on its face and (2) neutral 
in its application.186  Title VII does not single out a particular religion; it is 
generally applicable and facially neutral.  Since Zelman is the most recent 
articulation of the general rule for evaluating whether a law violates the 
Establishment Clause, it should no longer be claimed that the Establishment 
Clause supports the ministerial exception.187 
C. Replacement of Strict Church Autonomy with a Neutral Principles of Law 
Approach 
Post-Smith courts have rested the ministerial exception almost entirely on 
the right to church autonomy.188  Yet an alternative theory, endorsed by the 
Supreme Court, strikes at the heart of the autonomy doctrine.189  The theory—
that courts can intrude on church autonomy when applying neutral principles 
of law—allows ministers’ claims to proceed if no genuine religious 
justification is presented by their religious employer.190  Judge Edward Becker 
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to apply such an approach in 
Petruska v. Gannon University.191  The Third Circuit held that when a religious 
organization makes an employment decision based on “religious belief, 
religious doctrine, or church regulation,” it is “immune from a Title VII 
suit.”192  In contrast, “[e]mployment discrimination unconnected to religious 
 
 184 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 185 See WITTE, supra note 37, at 200 (describing how Zelman’s test is “closely parallel” to Smith’s). 
 186 See id. at 200–01 (summarizing the Zelman test). 
 187 C.f. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing reliance on the Establishment 
Clause post-Zelman). 
 188 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 189 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (allowing courts to apply neutral principles of law even if 
they infringe a church’s autonomy). 
 190 See Heller, supra note 39, at 696 (proposing a requirement that religious organizations put forth a 
religious justification to be protected by church autonomy); Elizabeth R. Pozolo, One Step Forward, One Step 
Back: Why the Third Circuit Got It Right the First Time in Petruska v. Gannon University, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1093, 1106 (2008) (endorsing the Third Circuit opinion that discussed such an approach). 
 191 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222 (3d Cir. 2006), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/ 
051222p.pdf, vacated on grant of rehearing, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 192 Id. at 25–26. 
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belief, religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply the 
exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitution 
protects.”193  Judge Becker grounded his opinion in the observation that if a 
religious justification for the discrimination has not been advanced, then the 
First Amendment has not been offended.194  When Judge Becker died shortly 
after the opinion was issued,195 the Third Circuit granted a rehearing of the 
case before a reconstituted panel of judges.196  This panel vacated Judge 
Becker’s original opinion and dismissed the case based on the deferential 
approach.197 
Yet Judge Becker’s concern with avoiding “compulsory deference” to the 
church was well-founded, as such “compulsory deference” was expressly 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf.198  In Jones, the Supreme 
Court’s most recent case dealing with a church property dispute, the Court 
determined that lower courts could use a “neutral principles” approach to 
decide internal church disputes.199  As lower courts use older intra-church 
dispute precedent to uphold the ministerial exception, this case demonstrates 
that the Court has not always been supportive of compulsory deference to 
religious organizations.200  A majority of states that have decided on a test 
following Jones have chosen the “neutral principles” approach for addressing 
intra-church disputes.201  Many recent circuit court opinions and commentators 
who support an absolute deferential approach fail even to mention the Jones 
 
 193 Id. at 5. 
 194 Pozolo, supra note 190, at 1117–18 (“[T]he court was able to avoid any serious conflict with the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses and still seriously consider Petruska’s sexual discrimination claim.”). 
 195 Henriques, supra note 8, at 1. 
 196 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (rehearing before a reconstituted panel). 
 197 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 307–08 (“[A]pplication of Title VII’s discrimination and retaliation provisions to 
Gannon’s decision to restructure would violate the Free Exercise Clause.”).  Judge Becker’s opinion was 
thereafter withdrawn.  448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 198 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (“We cannot agree, however, that the First Amendment requires the States to 
adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority . . . even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is 
involved.”); see also Pozolo, supra note 190, at 1113 n.173 (discussing Judge Becker’s use of this phrase and 
his understanding of Jones). 
 199 Jones, 443 U.S. at 605. 
 200 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing some of the church 
property cases cited in Smith as the precedential foundation of the ministerial exception to demonstrate that the 
exception survives Smith). 
 201 Jeffrey B. Hassler, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church 
Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 457 (2008) 
(listing all states’ approaches to church property disputes and arguing for a strict neutral-principles approach). 
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decision, despite basing such deference largely or completely on the Supreme 
Court’s approach to intra-church disputes.202 
In Jones, a local church body had purchased property completely with 
funds raised from the local parishioners.203  When a majority of the church 
decided to split from the governing body of the denomination, the minority, 
who had left the church to worship elsewhere, brought suit claiming that the 
church property belonged to the hierarchical governing body.204  The Georgia 
Supreme Court found for the majority by applying a “neutral principles of law” 
approach similar to the one applied by Judge Becker.205  On appeal, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Court held that Georgia’s approach was constitutional.206  
The Court held that states are free to determine intra-church disputes if the 
dispute does not implicate religious doctrine and practice.207  Accordingly, 
courts were given permission to intrude into church autonomy by applying a 
“neutral principles of law” approach when a court does not need to determine 
matters of religious doctrine.208  The Court distinguished its prior cases on 
intra-church disputes as only prohibiting courts from resolving disputes on the 
basis of “religious doctrine or polity.”209  The Court even encouraged lower 
courts to adopt a neutral-principles approach, saying the “primary advantages 
of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, 
and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization 
and polity.”210  In light of the Court’s approval of the neutral-principles 
approach in Jones and mandate of neutrality in Smith, it becomes clear that 
automatic deference to religious governing bodies is not the Supreme Court’s 
required, or even preferred, method of dealing with church autonomy. 
 
 202 See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox 
Diocese as support for complete deference but never mentioning Jones); Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil 
Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 
and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 51, 74–76 (2008) (arguing that there is no 
subject matter jurisdiction over a minister’s claims by relying on intra-church property dispute cases but failing 
to mention Jones). 
 203 Jones, 443 U.S. at 597. 
 204 Id. at 597–98. 
 205 Id. at 599. 
 206 Id. at 597. 
 207 Id. at 602 (“‘[A] State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes 
so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the 
tenets of faith.’” (quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring))). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)). 
 210 Id. at 603. 
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While some courts have been skeptical of whether Jones permits courts to 
hear employment discrimination claims against religious employers, further 
analysis suggests that the Court would allow such claims to be heard, 
especially if the religious employer has not put forth any religious justification 
for its actions.211  When a similar claim was advanced by a petitioner in the 
Sixth Circuit in Hutchinson v. Thomas, the court responded that Jones was 
limited to property disputes and that a church employment decision regarding 
ministers “concerns internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of 
which are governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law.”212  Yet, as 
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. 
Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. held that the government does not violate 
constitutional rights simply by “investigating the circumstances” surrounding 
the discharge of an employee of a religious institution.213  Moreover, the Jones 
majority specifically mentioned church employment, stating that the “neutral-
principles approach cannot be said to ‘inhibit’ the free exercise of religion, any 
more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in 
which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.”214 
Critics of Jones argue that applying neutral principles in suits against 
religious organizations may have unintended results, like encouraging suits 
against religious organizations to enforce regulations governing the structure of 
nonprofit organizations.215  The solution is simple: legislatures should write 
nonprofit organization regulations specifically to exclude churches from rigid 
laws governing their internal structure.  Unintended results may be avoided by 
careful drafting of legislation applicable to religious organizations. 
Nevertheless, this argument highlights a benefit of the strict scrutiny approach 
over the neutral-principles approach, since the government’s interest in such 
business regulations would probably be outweighed by a church’s right to 
decide its own structure. 
 
 211 Compare Hutchinson v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply Jones in the 
employment discrimination context), with Brant, supra note 34, at 294 (arguing that Jones undermines a right 
to church autonomy). 
 212 Hutchinson, 789 F.2d at 396.  The Sixth Circuit added, “The neutral principles doctrine relating to 
church property is simply not applicable in the instant case.”  Id. 
 213 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986). 
 214 Jones, 443 U.S. at 606. 
 215 Dane, supra note 170, at 1745. 
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Other courts and commentators are also supportive of using Jones to 
undermine churches’ absolute right to self-autonomy.216  Scholars have argued 
that Jones “sharply undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause 
confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy upon religious organizations.”217  
Courts have used the neutral-principles approach to counter arguments for a 
right to self-governance when tackling tough questions like sexual abuse 
claims against religious organizations.218  The Supreme Court’s recent embrace 
of neutral laws, even when doing so restricts free exercise, further strengthens 
the argument for lower courts to apply neutral principles and suggests that the 
Court is likely to apply this approach to a ministerial exception case.219 
III.  MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MINISTERS’ EMPLOYMENT 
CLAIMS 
Since the deferential approach is constitutionally unsound, the question 
remains how to deal with ministers’ claims against their religious employers 
appropriately under neutral federal statutes.  If no weight is given to church 
autonomy after Jones, then one option is applying generally applicable federal 
employment law to religious employers as long as it can be done by applying 
neutral principles.220  Under this approach, when no religious justification for 
the church’s action is put forward, as is often the case in suits for sexual 
harassment221 or breach of an employment contract,222 ministers could 
automatically proceed with their claims.  Also, courts would be permitted to 
 
 216 See Brant, supra note 34, at 294 (acknowledging that Jones changes the right to church autonomy); 
Dane, supra note 170, at 1738 (“[S]ome courts have applied the ‘neutral principles of law’ mantra in a range of 
situations to erode the organizational self-governance . . . .  This is most apparent in some of the context of 
sexual abuse and related claims . . . .”). 
 217 Brant, supra note 34, at 294. 
 218 Dane, supra note 170, at 1738 (“[S]ome courts have applied the ‘neutral principles of law’ mantra in a 
range of situations to erode the organizational self-governance . . . this is most apparent in some of the context 
of sexual abuse and related claims.”). 
 219 See WITTE, supra note 37, at 200–01 (arguing that the Court is reducing religious liberty protection to 
a neutrality standard); Jennifer McLain, Discrimination in the Religious Workplace—Should It Be Permitted to 
Continue, 17 LAB. LAW. 517, 540 (2002) (suggesting that the Supreme Court would apply a neutral principles-
of-law approach if it reviewed a ministerial exception case). 
 220 See Lupu, supra note 94, at 401 (arguing that after Jones, “[e]ven in its more moderate form . . . the 
concept of church autonomy is not a defensible one”). 
 221 See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.1999) (“The 
Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harassment Bollard alleges; indeed, they condemn it as 
inconsistent with their values and beliefs.”). 
 222 See Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 208, 212 (N.J. 1992) (deciding that two nuns bringing 
suit based on their employment contracts were not ministers but suggesting that they should have been allowed 
to proceed, even if they were ministers, if the suit did not involve religious doctrine). 
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engage in discovery to determine if a church’s stated justification is merely 
pretext.223  Yet many commentators argue that, in following Jones, there is still 
a place for a stronger free exercise right of church autonomy,224 which even 
survives Smith, based on the organization-versus-individual distinction.225  The 
Supreme Court has never addressed how to analyze whether a neutral law 
impermissibly infringes on church autonomy,226 and the Court’s dwindling 
docket suggests it likely will not address it soon.227  If a right to church 
autonomy survives, it will not take a form of unfettered deference to the church 
regarding employment decisions.228  This Part advocates the use the Court’s 
pre-Smith test—balancing church and government interests—to analyze 
whether neutral laws impermissibly infringe on church autonomy.229 
Smith clearly eliminates strict scrutiny review of neutral laws infringing 
upon individual free exercise rights, but since the majority of lower courts find 
that religious organizations are exempted from Smith,230 it is logical to return 
 
 223 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986) (allowing 
government entities to research whether a religious organization’s stated religious justification for an 
employment decision is merely pretext). 
 224 Many eminent religious liberty scholars argue that autonomy is a free exercise, rather than an 
establishment, concern.  See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 72, at 1394 (arguing that church autonomy should be 
analyzed under the Free Exercise rather than the Establishment Clause); Lupu, supra note 94, at 422 (“Rights 
of free exercise are quintessentially rights of autonomy.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Dane, supra note 170, at 1718 (“The better question, then, is not whether institutional 
autonomy survives Smith, but rather . . . why, how, to what extent, and in what form, does a special, 
constitutionally required regime for churches survive Smith’s apparent rejection of the proposition that the 
Constitution demands a special regime for the free exercise of religion in general?”); Paul Horwitz, Churches 
as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 118–22 (2009) 
(arguing for a continued right to church autonomy following Jones and Smith). 
 226 See Underkuffler, supra note 75, at 1774–75 (“[T]he Court has never directly addressed the scope of 
free exercise protections when government interferes with religious-group affairs.”). 
 227 See Robert Barnes, Justices Continue Trend of Hearing Fewer Cases, WASH. POST., Jan. 7, 2007, at 
A04 (discussing the dwindling number of cases accepted by the Court during recent years). 
 228 See G. Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious 
Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1191, 1243–44 (1994) (not quite endorsing 
Sherbert strict scrutiny because of its recent disparagement in Smith but arguing that “[c]learly . . .  in the area 
of class discrimination by religious entities, reconciling the religious freedom and equality values requires a 
careful balancing of the conflicting interests at stake”). 
 229 For an interesting legal theory explanation for applying this type of standard to these cases, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Tension Between Sex Equality and Religious Freedom (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 167, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=995325 (arguing that while it 
is not rational to apply some laws burdening religion while not applying laws prohibiting discrimination, it is 
also not acceptable to apply all laws, and thus, a more correct analysis would apply something similar to strict 
scrutiny review). 
 230 E.g., Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 516 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing that the argument that Smith eliminates the ministerial exception has been 
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to the prevailing approach to free exercise claims prior to Smith—the approach 
that still applies when a law is not neutral, the Sherbert strict scrutiny 
balancing test.231  This test, the emerging minority approach to ministers’ 
claims,232 is sound because it does not automatically defer to either the church 
or the government, but rather it balances the interests involved, requiring the 
government to have a compelling interest relative to the infringement upon 
church autonomy for the law to apply.233  This test takes into account the 
courts’ concerns about church autonomy in applying the deferential approach 
as well as the governmental interest in enforcing generally applicable, neutral 
laws highlighted in Smith.234 
Strict scrutiny analysis was used pre-Smith to analyze autonomy defenses 
to ministers’ claims and is still used by courts to analyze autonomy defenses to 
non-ministerial employee claims.235  The Fourth Circuit explicitly used the 
Sherbert balancing test pre-Smith to analyze a church’s claim of autonomy.236  
While the court found that in that particular case the “balance weigh[ed] in 
favor of free exercise of religion,” its use of the balancing test preserved a tool 
the court could use when the government is able to “‘justify an inroad on 
religious liberty by showing that [the federal law] is the least restrictive means 
of achieving some compelling state interest.’”237  The Ninth Circuit, in 
adopting strict scrutiny review for ministers’ sexual harassment claims, 
decided that it “must apply the Sherbert balancing test in roughly the same 
manner as in cases involving lay employees in order to determine whether the 
application of Title VII in this case would violate” a right to church 
autonomy.238 
 
“rejected by most, if not all, of the courts to have considered it” based on the justification that “the ministerial 
exception addresses the rights of the church while Smith addressed the rights of individuals”). 
 231 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
 232 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir.1999) (using a balancing 
test to allow a minister’s sexual harassment claim to proceed against a religious institution). 
 233 See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (utilizing the Sherbert 
balancing test as rearticulated in Yoder). 
 234 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1672 (arguing that while Smith may not apply to religious organizations, it definitely 
raises concerns over what should be done about government regulation that conflicts with church autonomy). 
 235 See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(using strict scrutiny to analyze a ministerial exception claim). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 1168–69 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)).  The 
Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court recognized the caveat from Yoder that “only those interests of the 
highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”  Id. at 1169 (quoting 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). 
 238 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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While the D.C. Circuit has hinted that Sherbert strict scrutiny is implicit 
within the deferential approach,239 it is dangerous not to explicitly apply strict 
scrutiny in every unique factual situation.  In EEOC v. Catholic University of 
America, after applying the deferential approach to dismiss a nun’s sex 
discrimination claim,240 the court claimed that the ministerial exception 
essentially embodies the strict scrutiny approach: 
The ministerial exception is judicial shorthand for two conclusions: 
the first is that the imposition of secular standards on a church’s 
employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise of religion; 
the second, that the state’s interest in eliminating employment 
discrimination is out-weighed by a church’s constitutional right of 
autonomy in its own domain.241 
While the D.C. Circuit may understand this shorthand, most courts do not 
disclose the balancing they undertake.242  As a result, their apparent absolute 
deference to religious organizations leaves no precedential tool for addressing 
complex situations where the weight of interests may change. 
Aside from being constitutional, the primary benefit of the minority 
approach that routinely and explicitly acknowledges the strict scrutiny test is 
that it gives courts freedom to engage in fresh balancing when there is an 
especially compelling government interest.243  The Fourth Circuit has twice 
resorted to Sherbert balancing to apply a neutral federal law in spite of 
religious justifications: first, to prohibit a church from using child labor in 
violation of federal employment laws,244 and second, to stop a church from 
paying lower wages to female employees in violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.245  The Ninth Circuit has noted the need to balance interests 
when evaluating sexual harassment claims by ministers or other claims that do 
not invoke religious doctrines.246  The Ninth Circuit has also stressed that 
churches should not be “free from all of the secular legal obligations that 
currently and routinely apply to them” and allowed a harassed minister to 
 
 239 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 240 Id. at 462. 
 241 Id. at 467. 
 242 See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (mentioning the Sherbert 
strict scrutiny test but using the deferential approach to decide the case, ignoring a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 243 Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1989) (using a balancing test to 
address a child labor situation). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 246 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (using a 
balancing test to allow a minister’s sexual harassment claim to proceed against a religious institution). 
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proceed with her claim.247  Closely balancing the government’s interest before 
dismissing a minister’s claim, the Tenth Circuit has echoed this sentiment, 
stating that the “church autonomy doctrine is not without limits . . . and does 
not apply to purely secular decisions, even when made by churches.”248  For 
church autonomy to be implicated, the alleged misconduct must first be 
“‘rooted in religious belief.’”249 
Even proponents of a strong right to church autonomy recognize that using 
strict scrutiny would legitimize a necessary analysis for balancing this right 
against the government’s interest in applying neutral laws.250  The church’s 
right to autonomy would likely outweigh its adherence to administrative 
regulations regarding business structure and fee requirements for use of 
facilities.251  Yet the church’s right to autonomy is unlikely to outweigh the 
government’s compelling interest in prohibiting non-doctrine-related violations 
of federal employment law, including sexual harassment,252 child labor,253 
unfair wages,254 and discrimination without religious justification.255  Scholars 
point out that the state’s interest in ending discrimination, rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is of “constitutional magnitude.”256  Also, if a court 
finds that an organization’s religious justifications are merely pretext for 
discrimination, as the Supreme Court did when applying Sherbert strict 
scrutiny in Bob Jones University v. United States,257 then the Sherbert test 
 
 247 Id. 
 248 Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 249 Id. at 657 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). 
 250 See Laycock, supra note 72, at 1402 (supporting a broad right to church autonomy and recognizing 
that although “[t]he Court has not yet explicitly balanced interests in a church autonomy case, . . . sooner or 
later it will have to do so”). 
 251 See id. at 1397–98 (arguing that “churches’ interest in autonomy extends to routine administrative 
matters”). 
 252 See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948 (allowing a sexual harassment claim to proceed against a church). 
 253 See Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1989) (deciding that a church’s 
right to autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause did not outweigh the government’s interest in prohibiting 
child labor). 
 254 See Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
government’s interest in requiring fair wages outweighed a church’s interest in autonomy). 
 255 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (refusing to allow broad deference without balancing when there was no 
religious justification for the violation). 
 256 See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying 
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1116 (1996) (“Job bias disputes are 
different from other religious conflicts because the state has a compelling state interest of constitutional 
magnitude that is absent in most other religious disputes.”). 
 257 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–604 (1983) (deciding that Bob Jones 
University would lose its tax-exempt status due to its prohibition of interracial relationships, which the 
university claimed was based on a biblical mandate). 
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weighs in favor of application of federal employment law to the religious 
organization. 
Following Smith, Congress attempted through RFRA to legislatively 
require strict scrutiny analysis.258  While the Second Circuit has decided that 
RFRA should be used to analyze a church’s claim of a right to autonomy,259 
most courts and commentators find RFRA inapplicable to suits between 
private parties.260  Some courts point to Section 2000bb-1(c), which states that 
a person may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.”261  Other courts 
point to language in Section 2000bb-1(b), which states that the “[g]overnment 
may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates” that the law satisfies strict scrutiny.262  These courts argue that 
“demonstrate” is defined as “meet[ing] the burdens of going forward with the 
evidence and of persuasion”263 and that when “the government is not a party, it 
cannot ‘go[] forward’ with any evidence.”264  Even if RFRA were amended to 
apply to religious organizations’ defenses against ministers’ claims, the results 
of RFRA analysis would be no more a bar to ministers’ claims of non-
religiously justified discrimination than Sherbert strict scrutiny review.265 
 
 258 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(c) (2006).  The statute provides: 
(a) . . . Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section.  (b) . . . Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.  (c) . . . A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation 
of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief against a government. 
 259 Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding a minister’s claims for analysis under 
RFRA instead of the ministerial exception framework). 
 260 See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (“RFRA is applicable 
only to suits to which the government is a party.”); John LeVangie, First Amendment Law—Hankins v. Lyght 
and the Unnecessary Intersection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Ministerial Exception, 30 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 668 (2008) (arguing that RFRA is inapplicable to ministerial exception cases, 
pointing to its inapplicability to suits between private parties). 
 261 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (2006); see also Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1042 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) as a 
reason why RFRA does not apply to suits between private parties). 
 262 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). 
 263 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3). 
 264 Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 203 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 265 Cf. Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1998) 
(recognizing that when the ministerial exception is inapplicable to the claim of a religious employee against 
her employer and neutral federal law is correspondingly applicable to the religious institution’s relationship 
with the employee, the employee’s claim automatically survives any RFRA defense by the religious institution 
as well). 
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IV.  LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL IMPROVING ANALYSIS OF MINISTERS’ 
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
Though guidance from the Supreme Court as to the correct approach to 
ministers’ claims against their employers would be ideal,266 scholars have 
suggested that the Court, by setting a low “neutrality” level of free exercise 
protection, may be shifting primary responsibility for protecting religious 
liberty to state courts.267  This trend positions Congress as the dominant 
enunciator of national, rather than state-specific, parameters of religious 
liberty.268  Accordingly, a second approach to address the difficulties courts 
face in deciding ministers’ claims would be for Congress to establish a test for 
these types of cases by amending federal employment laws.  Using Title VII as 
an example, this Part first shows that the current version of Title VII is 
intended to apply to religious organizations.  Second, this Part argues that 
under the proposed statutory amendment, ministers’ Title VII claims, when 
dismissed, should be dismissed according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  Finally, this Part proposes an amendment to Title VII that would 
address courts’ concerns about protecting religious organizations while also 
giving more protection to ministers. 
A. Statutory Application of Title VII to Religious Organizations 
As noted previously, Title VII explicitly exempts religious employers from 
suits for religious discrimination.269  The text of Title VII, however, never 
exempts religious organizations from suits against them for alleged racial or 
gender discrimination.270  The expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation 
 
 266 Whitney Ellenby, Divinity vs. Discrimination: Curtailing the Divine Reach of Church Authority, 26 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 369, 412 (1996) (making the case for the Supreme Court to provide more protection 
to ministers). 
 267 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State 
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith and Boerne 
have had the effect of inciting state courts to provide stronger religious liberty jurisprudence and noting that 
this would be in line with Justice Scalia’s federalist viewpoint). 
 268 See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 
76 (1998) (“Congress can grant more liberty with respect to federal law than the Court says it has to . . . .”). 
 269 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006) (“This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious [organization] 
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the 
carrying on by such [organization] of its activities.”). 
 270 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an  
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
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holds that expression of one thing implies exclusion of another.271  This canon 
suggests that because Congress expressly exempted religious employers from 
religious discrimination suits, but not from claims of other forms of 
discrimination, Congress intended for other types of discrimination suits to 
proceed against religious employers. 
Additionally, commentators have suggested that the legislative history of 
the statutory exemption from Title VII reveals that Congress intended to make 
religious organizations subject to discrimination suits on the basis of race, sex, 
or national origin.272  According to commentators, Congress explicitly 
“considered and rejected a blanket exemption that would have placed religious 
employers outside the scope of covered ‘employers.’”273  The original version 
of the legislation before the House of Representatives “provided a religious 
organization with a blanket exemption from the provisions of Title VII.”274  In 
rejecting this blanket exemption, the principal sponsor of the narrower 
language that eventually was adopted in Title VII commented that the general 
exemption for religious groups was limited to those practices relating “to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected 
with [the employer’s] religious activities.”275 
The McClure court recognized the broad language of Title VII but still 
chose to apply deference.276  After examining the Supreme Court church 
property dispute cases,277 the McClure court held that “Congress did not 
intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title 
VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church and minister.”278  
Despite the seminal nature of the McClure decision, other courts have 
 
 271 See EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW 323–28 (1994) 
(discussing and defining the statutory interpretation canon of expressio unius). 
 272 Brant, supra note 34, at 284–85 (“Instead, Congress chose to tailor the exemption narrowly, exempting 
religious institutions only from the law’s prohibition of religious discrimination.”); see also Vigars v. Valley 
Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“[A]lthough Congress permitted 
religious organizations to discriminate in favor of members of their faith, religious employers are not immune 
from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or for retaliatory actions against employees 
who exercise their rights under the statute.”). 
 273 Brant, supra note 34, at 284. 
 274 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 275 110 CONG. REC. 12,818 (1964). 
 276 McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61. 
 277 For examples of cases involving deference to religious organizations in property disputes, see id. at 
559 (examining Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952), and Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969)). 
 278 McClure, 460 F.2d at 560–61. 
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emphatically declined to embrace this portion of the McClure reasoning due to 
the weight of evidence against such reasoning.279 
B. Ministers’ Title VII Claims Should Be Dismissed Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
As a precursor to proposing changes to the text of Title VII, it is important 
to address a civil procedure dispute over the appropriate mechanisms for 
dismissal in ministerial exception cases.  Courts are currently split over 
whether to use Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction) or Rule 
12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) to dismiss 
these cases.280  The standard for a facial attack based on the ministerial 
exception under 12(b)(1) is virtually the same as that under 12(b)(6).281  Both 
rules require the court to take all the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.282  Because, as the Third Circuit has 
concluded, the “exception may serve as a barrier to the success of a 
[minister]’s claims, but it does not affect the court’s authority to consider” 
claims arising under federal law, the best rule for analyzing the exception is 
likely 12(b)(6).283  It has been noted by the Tenth Circuit that assertion of the 
“church autonomy doctrine . . . is similar to a government official’s defense of 
qualified immunity, which is frequently asserted in a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6).”284 
Furthermore, Rule 12(b)(1) is the incorrect procedural mechanism because 
it is better policy to allow courts to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
cases alleging violation of federal employment law under federal question 
 
 279 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that while courts like the 
one in McClure “have derived the ministerial exception from the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,” other 
courts “have determined that, under its plain language, Title VII applies to ministerial employment decisions”). 
 280 See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 206 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing differing approaches to 
dismissal of ministerial exception cases and stating that the most common approach has been dismissal 
according to Rule 12(b)(6)).  But see Kalscheur, supra note 202, at 87 (discussing the dispute over the proper 
ground for dismissal and endorsing dismissal according to Rule 12(b)(1) based on a right to church autonomy, 
but ignoring Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)). 
 281 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 299 n.1 (“Although we conclude that it is most properly construed as a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, we note that the standard is the same when considering a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1) or 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”). 
 282 See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d. Cir. 1977) (discussing in detail 
the differences between Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)). 
 283 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302–03. 
 284 Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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jurisdiction.285  Those who argue that 12(b)(1) should be used instead of 
12(b)(6) reason that secular courts should never intrude upon church 
autonomy.286  Yet as argued in this Comment, the Supreme Court has 
foreclosed the option of an absolute right to autonomy.287  First, Jones allows 
courts to hear matters involving church governance as long as they can be 
determined using neutral principles of law.288  Second, the Court has allowed 
secular governmental agencies to intrude upon church autonomy for purposes 
of employment claims to determine if a religious organization’s justifications 
for its actions are merely pretext.289  Even aside from these constitutional 
infirmities, it is dangerous policy to allow the church to have the unfettered 
ability to mistreat its ministers without any fear of accountability in secular 
courts due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
C. Amendment of Title VII 
Turning to the statute’s text, Section 2000e-1(a) of Title VII currently does 
“not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such [religious 
organization].”290  The Supreme Court upheld this provision exempting 
religious organizations from claims of religious discrimination because it was 
created for the “secular purpose of ‘assuring that the government remains 
neutral’” and “effectuates a more complete separation” of church and state.291 
To provide appropriate protection for both religious organizations and their 
ministers, a new paragraph should be added to Title VII that shifts to religious 
organizations the burden of producing a religious justification for their alleged 
employment discrimination.  If no such religious justification is produced, the 
court can proceed in evaluating the minister’s claim.  If a religious justification 
 
 285 See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006) (“[T]he Judicial Code gives federal courts 
subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions ‘arising under’ the laws of the United States.  Title VII actions 
fit that description.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1131 (2006) (citation omitted)). 
 286 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Federal courts are secular 
agencies [and] therefore do not exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of religious organizations.”). 
 287 See supra footnotes 79–82 and accompanying text; supra Part II.C. 
 288 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (holding that the application of neutral laws to intra-church 
disputes is constitutional even though it interferes with church autonomy). 
 289 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986). 
 290 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a) (2006). 
 291 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 332, 339 (1987) (quoting Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 812 (D. Utah 1984)). 
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is produced, the court’s inquiry will be limited to determining whether the 
evidence proves that the religious justification is merely pretext.292  Since the 
current version of Title VII does not limit courts in this manner, this 
amendment would “effectuate[] a more complete separation” of church and 
state and ‘“assur[e] that the government remains neutral.’”293  This amendment 
could be placed after the current exemption in section 2000e-1(a) and could 
read: 
A claim under § 2000e-2 is allowed to proceed against a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society unless 
such organization produces a religious justification for their 
discriminatory employment decision.  If such a justification is 
produced, judicial inquiry is limited to examining whether the 
justification is merely pretext for discrimination.  If the 
justification is not pretext, then the claim should be dismissed 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
If Smith, Zelman, and Jones have in fact overridden a constitutional to 
church autonomy in church governance, this new amendment will apply in 
every case brought by a minister against a religious employer.  If a right to 
church autonomy in general church governance has survived those cases, 
before dealing with the statute, courts will need to deal with the religious 
institution’s general right to be free from government interference in its 
administrative decisions.  This will require courts to apply strict scrutiny in 
individual cases and balance, case-by-case, the interest of the government in 
enforcement of this new amendment and the church’s interest autonomy.  In 
many cases the government’s compelling interest in eliminating racial and 
gender discrimination that has no genuine religious justification will override a 
church’s claim of autonomy,294 and since this amendment is the least 
restrictive means of achieving that goal, most claims will pass strict scrutiny 
review.  Yet in cases where enforcement of the provision would violate core 
doctrines of the church or require ongoing monitoring of church management 
by the court, a surviving right to autonomy may be infringed.295  Overall, this 
 
 292 See Corbin, supra note 93, at 2017 (giving examples of how evidence concerning a teacher’s claim 
against a religious school could be gathered without invoking determinations of church doctrine). 
 293 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339 (quoting Amos, 594 F. Supp. at 812) (holding that the current exemption for 
religious organizations from claims of religious discrimination is constitutional for this reason). 
 294 See Rutherford, supra note 256, at 1116 (“The state’s interest in eliminating job bias is even stronger 
than most interests it asserts as compelling, because it is supported by the egalitarian language in the 
Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes.”). 
 295 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (allowing exemption for the Amish from 
compulsory school attendance rules because the matter was “not merely a matter of personal preference, but 
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amendment would protect ministers and other religious employees from 
discrimination by religious organizations, while still allowing religious 
organizations the freedom to make employment decisions based on core 
religious beliefs. 
CONCLUSION 
The deferential approach currently gives churches free rein to engage in 
actions that are repugnant to our national conscience: racial discrimination, 
gender discrimination, and even sexual harassment.  The harsh results of 
deference and the refusal of most circuit courts to examine the government’s 
interest in these cases provide clear evidence of the need for a better test.  
Moreover, the deferential approach relies upon precedent that does not deal 
with neutral laws, such as Title VII, and has been stripped of every 
constitutional foundation it might otherwise be based upon.  Smith reduced free 
exercise protection to an easily passed neutrality test; Zelman reduced 
disestablishment protection to a similarly weak neutrality analysis; and Jones 
severely undermined the idea of a strong right to church autonomy. 
A federal right to church autonomy may not exist under modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence, but this does not mean federal employment law 
should be hastily applied to religious employers without any regard for 
religious liberty.  With the low standard of neutrality that has been set by the 
Supreme Court, Congress should act to amend Title VII to strike a balance 
between protecting ministers on the one hand and preserving the autonomy of 
religious organizations on the other.  Title VII should apply to religious 
organizations unless they have a genuine religious justification for their 
actions.  Courts should be allowed to hear evidence that the religious 
justification is mere pretext, but they should be forced to dismiss a minister’s 
claims if a genuine religious justification is put forward. 
If a limited right to church autonomy remains, courts should engage in 
strict scrutiny review, balancing the government’s interest against religious 
organizations’ First Amendment rights.  This would allow ministers to proceed 
with their claims when judicial action would do little to infringe upon a 
church’s autonomy, especially in situations where a church has engaged in 
 
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living”); Bryce 
v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 660 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that when a church’s 
core doctrine condemns homosexual activity, a minister’s suit under Title VII alleging discrimination because 
of her homosexuality was barred by a right to church autonomy). 
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egregiously unacceptable activity, such as child labor, unfair wages, or sexual 
harassment.  After a court has engaged in strict scrutiny analysis and decided a 
minister can proceed, it could then use the suggested amendment to Title VII 
to determine if there is any permissible justification for the organization’s 
actions. 
To preserve a decent society, religious organizations must be neither above 
the law nor subject to unnecessary government oversight.  The current 
deferential approach allows religious organizations to engage in repugnant 
employment activities without any accountability in secular courts.  The plight 
of pastors whose claims of unfair employment activities are being rejected by 
the judiciary demands that courts and the legislature reconsider this approach.  
This Comment demonstrates that our constitutional jurisprudence compels a 
more fair approach than the current deference model and that the inadequacy 
of federal employment law necessitates congressional action to protect 
ministers while addressing court concerns regarding intrusion into church 
governance. 
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